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latter to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate are
thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn from the
thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for the things to which we
ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate.
For instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence
32/Aristotle
are more easily carried away towards self-indulgence than towards pro-
priety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the directions
in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore self-indul-
gence, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance.
9
That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it
is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other defi-
ciency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is
intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated.
Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy
task to find the middle, e.g., to find the middle of a circle is not for every
one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get angry that is
easy or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the
right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way,
that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare
and laudable and noble.
Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what
is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises
Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.
For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore,
since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second best, as
people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be done best in the
way we describe. But we must consider the things towards which we
ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing,
some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the
pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for
we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from er-
ror, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.
Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded
against; for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel to-
wards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all
circumstances repeat their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we
are less likely to go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sum the matter
up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.
But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases; for
or is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provo-
Nicomachean Ethics/33
cation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise
those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we
praise those who get angry and call them manly. The man, however,
who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the
direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more
widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to
what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is
not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is
perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the
decision rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the interme-
diate state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline some-
times towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall
we most easily hit the mean and what is right.
BOOK III
1
Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary
passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are
involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the volun-
tary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are
studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view
to the assigning both of honours and of punishments. Those things, then,
are thought-involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing
to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is
outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person
who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g., if he were to be carried
somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power.
But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils
or for some noble object (e.g., if a tyrant were to order one to do some-
thing base, having one s parents and children in his power, and if one
did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to
death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or vol-
untary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing
of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods
away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself
and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed,
but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the
time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the
occasion. Both the terms, then,  voluntary and  involuntary, must be
34/Aristotle
used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts volun-
tarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in
such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in
a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, there-
fore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one
would choose any such act in itself.
For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they en-
dure something base or painful in return for great and noble objects
gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest
indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior
person. On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is,
when one does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains hu-
man nature and which no one could withstand. But some acts, perhaps,
we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the most
fearful sufferings; for the things that  forced Euripides Alcmaeon to
slay his mother seem absurd. It is difficult sometimes to determine what
should be chosen at what cost, and what should be endured in return for
what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule
what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence
praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or
have not.
What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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